Selling Sex

The issue seems to be: “Is it morally permissible for business owners to use their businesses to promote sexual autonomy?” In order to try to answer this question, I will first go over the arguments in favor of business owners using their businesses to promote sexual autonomy. Next, I will analyze the arguments in relation to different ethical principles, namely the Harm Principle, the Principle of Consistency, and the Basic Rights Principle. Finally, I will argue, no, it is not morally permissible for business owners to use their businesses to promote sexual autonomy, specifically in the ways allegedly noted, because these actions actually harm individual sexual autonomy.

There are several main arguments in favor of business owners using their businesses to promote sexual autonomy. First, it is argued the nature of the business, meaning the fashion industry, is sexual, therefore using a business to promote sexual autonomy is just an extension of the fashion industry. Also it is argued the sexualized culture at the business helps morale because sex brings people closer together and those in or hoping for sexual relationships will gladly spend more time at work. Furthermore, it is argued the promotion of sexual autonomy is consensual because employees sign a release form acknowledging they are aware they will be working in a sexualized culture, and those who participate consensually in the sexual behaviors at work are preserving their right to decide for themselves what is appropriate for them and then their right to act on that decision. Also it is argued the promotion of sexual autonomy at work confronts taboos about sex. Additionally, it is argued restrictions against such actions would be unconstitutional restrictions on freedom of expression, which would result in legal moralism (the state using their authority to enforce a particular morality) or legal paternalism (the state restricting the decisions of mentally competent adults “for their own good”).

John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian Harm Principle states, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” and not just harm, but imminent serious harm. As a utilitarian principle, Mill is concerned with the utility of the principle, namely, that the principle will result in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. For Mill, freedom of expression should be protected because the truth of any issue can be determined only when all views are represented, and because people best appreciate the truth when it is achieved through their own reason and experience, which leads to the greatest good for the greatest number. If indeed promotion of sexual autonomy at work helps morale, then this would be the good for the greatest number. Also, confronting taboos about sex and promoting sexual autonomy where consenting adults decide for themselves what is appropriate and then act on it, would be promoting the truth about sex in general for society and independently for each individual. Freedom of expression regarding sex is one more view for others to incorporate into their reason and experience in order to reach the truth.

However, many argue far more people are harmed by such actions then are benefited from the freedom of expression. As a consequential theory, all that matters is the consequences of the actions and if actions can be shown to cause serious harm to others, then the actions are wrong. It has been argued pornography is “akin to libelous speech” against women, “a sort of false advertising” about who women are and what women want, which causes harm to women’s “reputation, credibility, opportunities and earning potentials.” Some arguments focus on the harm to men, asserting the actions promoted conditions men to view women as objects which leads to men being unable to have healthy relationships with women. However, the greater harm may very well be in the notion of autonomy itself. Mill’s theory is not autonomy centered, but if one is seeking to promote individual sexual autonomy and the promotion of sexual autonomy in the ways he is allegedly doing so is causing a serious amount of harm to individual autonomy, then his actions would be impermissible.

Looking at the point that the fashion industry is sexualized, therefore, sexualized actions are merely an extension of the fashion industry. The point with this argument seems to be, the fashion industry is sexualized and he works in the fashion industry, so having a sexualized culture at work is appropriate to promote sexual autonomy. I would like to look at this point using Immanuel Kant’s deontological Consistency Principle, which is tied to his Categorical Imperative. Kant’s Categorical Imperative asserts “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become universal law.” The Consistency Principle asserts immoral acts can only work based on the essence of immorality, meaning, immoral acts only achieve the desired results if the person committing the act is making an exception for themselves or holding themselves to special standards. The universalization of immoral acts, according to Kant, would lead to the act no longer being able to achieve the desired results. In the claim it is okay to have a sexualized culture at a fashion business because the fashion industry is sexualized, it is implied one is making an exception for oneself. The desire, seems to be, to have a sexualized culture at work to promote sexual autonomy. The actions in question are calling women derogatory names, committing sex acts with and in front of employees, using sexually explicit ads and using adult magazines as wall paper. What if these actions were universalized? What if every place of employment promoted sexual autonomy by committing such acts? The acts would fail to promote sexual autonomy, because the acts would force one view of sexual autonomy onto others who may have a different view. The only way these acts can promote anything like sexual autonomy is if they are not universalized.

Furthermore, Kant’s notion of autonomy, as in the ability to reason and will, is a central to what gives individuals intrinsic value, instead of instrumental value. For Kant, those with intrinsic value are never to be used merely as a means to an end, but as an end in themselves. Intrinsic value, argued Kant, gives individuals rights to not be treated like a tool to be used by another then discarded when they are no longer useful. Such actions do not support autonomy under this view. I need to define a very important term, namely, pornography. Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin define, in part, pornography as “the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities,” women “in postures of sexual submission or servility or display” and/or “reduced to body parts.” The issue is not simple nudity and the issue is not sexually graphic material where women are treated with respect and equality. The issue is dehumanizing women as sexual objects by calling them “sluts,” or reducing women to body parts with advertising focused specifically on that body part and calling women “c-nts” or, requesting photographs of employees and encouraging firing “ugly” employees, or as alleged by a former employee, reducing women to sexual servility by turning them into “sex slaves.” All of these actions reduce a woman to a tool with merely instrumental value. One could argue, if the woman consents, wouldn’t this be allowing the woman autonomy? Kant argued to allow oneself “to be used for the satisfaction of sexual desire, to make oneself an object of demand, is to dispose over oneself as over a thing” and when one does so, one is reduced to “a thing on which another satisfies his appetite.” Kant argues if one consents to the objectification, one is treating themselves as a tool, which means they are denying themselves autonomy.

A main argument offered in the case rests on the equal basic right of freedom of expression, and argues restricting conduct or language would restrict freedom of expression. John Rawls’ Basic Rights Principle, which states “each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all.” Rawls argues a list of basic rights, which includes the freedom of expression, originates from and enables the citizenry’s moral power to judge if social systems are just and moral power to work to bring about the good in the society. One primary good, or circumstance within society which allows the citizenry to exercise their moral powers, is, for Rawls, the combined freedom to think for oneself and the liberty to decide for oneself what is right and wrong, in other words, autonomy. One who promotes such actions obviously views sex differently from some others and is a competent adult. The government restricting one’s language and actions would be forcing a particular morality on him and restricting his decisions, thus would be restricting his liberty to think for himself and decide what is right and wrong-would be restricting his autonomy. One’s freedom of expression allows for individuals to judge if a social system is just and work to bring about the good in society because by one’s behavior being in the public realm, it allows for open discussion, and subsequent judgments, about such actions within the social system and allows for individuals to work toward their judgments about whether these types of behavior are good for the society.

However, Catharine MacKinnon argues pornography, objectification and derogatory language about women all violate women’s equal basic rights to freedom of expression. MacKinnon argues pornography (and implicitly by extension objectification and derogatory language) conditions men “to treat women as their sexual subordinates” which, therefore, “systematically and differentially silences” women. MacKinnon offers three reasons for her conclusion, namely, being viewed as sexual subordinates causes women to be reluctant to speak up, if women do speak up their comments are given very little serious attention, and if women do speak up their comments are misconstrued or misunderstood. To add to MacKinnon’s argument, if women are not speaking up they may be able to use their moral power to judge if a social system is just, but their judgments, without being in the public realm, have no way to work toward the good of society. Additionally, if women’s comments are not being considered seriously, or if their comments are being misunderstood or misconstrued, then women cannot exercise fully their moral power to work toward the good of society because their comments intended to work toward the good of society are not being received as intended, causing their abilities to be hindered. If women cannot work toward the good of society, their autonomy is restricted because, being individual members of society, they can‘t act toward their own good. Also, it is argued pornography, objectification and derogatory language prevents an individual’s abilities to be autonomous because it “reinforces a dominant public perception” about women and sexuality which prevents both women and men from deciding for themselves what is appropriate for them and then acting on that decision.

Such alleged actions are morally impermissible because they harm individual sexual autonomy. First, if such actions were universalized, then it would be forcing one view of sexuality onto everyone, thus destroying the concept of sexual autonomy. Secondly, such actions reduce people to mere tools with only instrumental value. Thirdly, if one consents to be treated as such, they are reducing themselves to a mere tool. Fourthly, such actions seriously hinder women’s freedom of speech, which in turn prevents women from being able to work toward the good of society, thus limiting their autonomy. Fifthly, such actions reinforce dominant ideals about what women and sexuality should be which prevents men and women from deciding for themselves what sexuality should be then acting on it. Therefore, no, it is not morally permissible for business owners to use their businesses to promote sexual autonomy in the ways that has been described.