Neural Correlates of Consciousness and the Global Workspace Model of Consciousness

Empirical evidence for the causal or correlational connection between the mind and brain has been elusively sought by many neuroscientists and philosophers for over a hundred years. The question is: How, exactly, do each person’s phenomenal and subjective experiences arise from neuronal firings and physiological processes in the brain? Many neuroscientists have sought to answer this question by trying to find the “neural correlates of consciousness,” meaning, the exact areas of the brain which give rise to conscious experiences. For this research paper, I will go over some current (from earliest to most recent) biological studies and research into the neural correlates of consciousness. Also, I will outline how each study seems to correlate not only with one another, but also with one viable biological theory into the nature of phenomenal and subjective consciousness, namely, the global workspace model of consciousness.

In “Neural Correlates of Consciousness in Humans,” Geraint Rees et al offers an overall review of several research studies into the neural correlates of consciousness, specifically focusing on the sense of vision as the starting point for conscious experience. First, Geraint et al offers two important distinctions regarding consciousness. The first distinction is between the neural correlates of being awake (as opposed to being asleep) versus the neural correlates of being phenomenally aware of one’s experiences (meaning, what it is like for one as an individual to have an experience). The second distinction is between neural activity correlated to a phenomenal experience versus neural activity correlated to underlying, unconscious processes or sensory inputs related to those phenomenal experiences.

These distinctions are important because visual processes can cause activity in the brain on many different levels, however, this activity does not necessarily reflect consciousness in the sense of being phenomenally aware. For example, sleepwalkers can see and subsequently interact with their environments in complex ways, but have no actual conscious, phenomenal awareness of what they are seeing or doing. Additionally, it is important to understand the visual pathway starts at the V1 in the back of the brain and moves through many other areas of the brain. Rees et al describe how damage to the primary visual cortex (V1) results in a condition known as blindsight, where a person can seemingly perceive of objects they report being unable to actually see. Additionally, Rees et al describe how blinking and microsaccades (slight, quick eye movements which occur normally and frequently) both do not interrupt our conscious perceptions, but both register changes in activity in the V1. Blindsight, blinking, and microsaccades, are just a few examples offered by Rees et al which demonstrate how the V1, even though necessary for normal eyesight, is not a neural correlate of consciousness because the V1 can be damaged resulting in one having no visual perception but having some conscious perception of objects or because the V1 can undergo fluctuations in activity without altering phenomenal experience.

Rees et al offers other evidence in support of another area of the visual system, the ventral visual cortex, as playing more of a role in conscious phenomenal experiences. Rees et al note how damage to specific areas of the visual system result in the subject being unable to consciously perceive of the specific type of visual features associated with this area. Rees et al explain specific areas of the visual system are specialized to analyze visual input for specific types of visual stimuli, and activity in these areas is required for one to have consciousness of that specific type of visual stimuli. As examples, Rees et al notes damage to the middle temporal area of the ventral visual cortex leads to one being unable to perceive of movement (a condition known as akinetopsia) or damage to areas in the ventral occipitotemporal cortex leads to one being unable to perceive of colors (a condition known as achromatopsia). In both circumstances, the individual is seeing the stimuli, but not consciously perceiving of it. Further, Rees et al notes neuroimaging studies have shown the ventral visual cortex is active during schizophrenic hallucinations, where the patients are having a phenomenal experience with no corresponding visual stimuli.

Additionally, as subjects are flashed “masked” (or hidden by flashing symbols before and after) and “unmasked” (or unhidden by not flashing symbols after) words within their field of vision, areas of the brain which are connected to an individual thinking about the meaning of a word only show activation when the individual reports consciously perceiving the unmasked word. The area previously activated becomes deactivated when the individual’s phenomenal experience changes by no longer perceiving the masked word, even though the word flashing in their field of vision remains the same. Finally, Rees et al notes how electrophysiological research using epileptic patients with embedded electrodes shows how neurons in the anterior areas of the medial temporal lobe fire in response to a specific type of visual stimuli and, in other neuroimaging studies, these neurons also fire when the individual is asked to imagine the specific type of visual stimuli.

Contrarily, Rees et al also refers to fMRI studies which show how individuals with damage to the V1 area have shown activation in the extrastriate cortex of the ventral visual cortex, in an area specifically related to perceiving facial stimuli, when the facial stimuli is not presented nor initiated. Additionally, Rees et al mentions another study which found activity was still triggered in the extrastriate visual cortex even when individuals were unable to perceive a masked word, meaning, even when individuals were not consciously aware of the word. These studies seem to show activity in the ventral visual cortex which is not related to visually stimulated, conscious perception. However, Rees et al notes regarding the masked word study, while there is activity, it occurs at a much smaller frequency for masked words than for perceived words. Rees et al conclude even though the focused areas of the ventral visual cortex to specific visual types of stimuli is required for conscious, phenomenal experiences of stimuli related to those types, the ventral visual cortex in and of itself may not be sufficient to produce conscious, phenomenal experiences.

Rees et al offer other possible conditions necessary for individual phenomenal consciousness. Rees et al note how neuroimaging studies have shown when an individual is presented with two different images, one displayed in front of one eye while the other is displayed over the other eye, the individual’s attention and perception of the images switches back and forth between the two images. As the individual’s attention switches back and forth, activity is recorded in the individual’s extrastriate cortex, and parietal and frontal cortexes. The activity is similar to the activity observed in other studies as an individual views images such as Rubin’s face/vase figure. Rees et al assert this activity demonstrates a possible causal connection between the frontal and parietal cortexes and an individual’s phenomenal experience in focusing on images or objects competing visually. Additionally, Rees et al note how in other studies activity has been observed in the parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal regions when individuals go from being unaware of something changing in their field of vision and becoming aware of the change within their field of vision. Due to the findings of these studies, Rees et al assert it may be activity in the ventral visual pathway requires in connection additional activity from the parietal and prefrontal regions in order for awareness.

In “The Quest to Find Consciousness,” Gerhard Roth also discusses neural correlates of consciousness by explaining in more depth the neurological processes leading to activity in areas of the brain believed to correlate with consciousness. Researchers have discovered consciousness, according to Roth, requires the associative regions of the cerebral cortex. Roth explains the associative regions of the cerebral cortex are the occipital, parietal, temporal and frontal regions.

Roth asserts in the associative regions there exists “millions of nerve cells that are densely interconnected,” in which the “synapses can strengthen or weaken their connections for a short time”. Roth explains the ability of the synapses to strengthen or weaken their connections results in synchronized communication between the nerve cells so that all the nerve cells become focused together on a single experience, like picking out one object from several objects or understanding the meanings of words.

Furthermore, Roth explains, chemical neurotransmitters, such as glutamate or gamma-aminobutyric acid, are “messenger[s]” which signals the nerve cells and synapses to synchronize and modulate the changes in activity. Roth asserts the reticular formations and limbic centers control the release of chemical neurotransmitters. “Neuromodulating,” the controlled release of these neurotransmitters and the subsequent nerve cell and synaptic alternations in activity based on the individual’s circumstances, requires a lot of fuel, specifically oxygen and glucose, according to Roth. In order to accommodate the need for more oxygen and glucose, Roth notes how blood flow to the area increases almost immediately.

Roth explains the reason why the associative cortex allows for consciousness may be because of the vast number of nerve cell connections. When a stimulus is presented to an individual, basic sensory information is processed by the primary and secondary regions of the cortex then sent to the associative regions in the parietal and temporal lobes which then registers activity explains Roth. The specific areas in the parietal, occipital and temporal lobes which carry on higher order processing of various forms of sensory information have “reverse” connections back to the primary and secondary regions says Roth. Additionally, the associative cortex is also connected to the hippocampus (in the medial temporal lobe and is responsible for memory) and the amygdala in the limbic system (also in the medial temporal lobe and is responsible for “emotional memory”) explains Roth. Roth asserts the vast connections between the associative regions of the cerebral cortex and to other areas along with the interactive synchronization between nerve cells and synapses between the associative regions of the cerebral cortex and to other areas such as the thalamus, hippocampus and limbic systems, may be the answer to how consciousness arises from physical processes.

Similar to both Rees et al’s and Roth’s assertions, in “Conscious Awareness of Flicker in Humans Involves Frontal and Parietal Cortex,” David Carmel et al asserts the frontal and parietal areas (which are associative regions of the cerebral cortex) may contribute to conscious awareness of visual stimuli. Carmel et al used an LED flickering at the “critical flicker fusion (CFF) threshold,” meaning at the point where the flickering could just as likely be perceived as either flickering or as a steady stream of light. Carmel et al tested the flickering at the CFF threshold to determine whether subjects viewed the identical flickering of the stimulus as either flickering or a steady stream of light. As the subjects responded, Carmel et al monitored their brain activity using fMRIs in order to determine where the activity occurred based on perceptions of the light flickering versus perceptions of the light being a steady stream.

Carmel et al deduced subjects perceiving of the light as flickering or a steady stream would be a result of activation of the higher cortical regions because the activation of neurons in the “early” visual cortex (see above regarding Rees et al’s research regarding the primary visual cortex) respond to flickering at a much higher rate than the CFF. In other words, Carmel et al reasoned higher cortical regions must be responsible for an individual’s perception of a light appearing to be flashing versus a steady stream because the primary visual cortex can see the flickering of a light source when the flickering is occurring at a much faster rate than the higher cortical regions can consciously perceive of it, which goes along with Rees et al’s findings. Further, Carmel et al hypothesized activity in the frontal and parietal regions would determine if the flickering of the LED would be perceived (meaning, as “conscious awareness”) as either a flicker or a steady stream of light.

Carmel et al’s results of the fMRIs showed more activity in the frontal and parietal cortexes when the subject reported perceiving of the light as a flicker. Carmel et al notes the results showed more activity in the occipital extrastriate cortex when the subjects reported perceiving of the light as a steady stream. Carmel et al’s results seem to corroborate with Rees et al’s research regarding the extrastriate cortex, the frontal and parietal cortexes showing activation in response to the display of two different images in subjects’ visual fields. In both Carmel et al’s and Rees et al’s scenarios, the subjects are consciously trying to determine what they are seeing. According to Carmel et al, their results demonstrate how important the activity in the higher cortical regions is for awareness in certain types of visual events. Furthermore, Carmel et al assert their results show how particularly the frontal and parietal regions may be involved in overall visual awareness.

In “Human Single-Neuron Responses at the Threshold of Conscious Recognition,” R. Quian Quiroga et al also examine neuronal activity. However, their research focuses on activity in the medial temporal lobe, which corresponds with Roth’s findings regarding consciousness requiring the associative areas of the brain and connections to the hippocampus and limbic systems (located in the medial temporal lobe). Quiroga et al explain the process of visual perception starts with the neurons in the primary visual cortex (“early visual areas”), which take in the visual stimuli, and then moves along the ventral visual pathway to neurons in the higher cortical regions which will organize and analyze the information to result in conscious recognition. According to Quiroga et al, the medial temporal lobe is the apex where perception takes place. While the medial temporal lobe, per Quiroga et al, does not directly affect conscious recognition, it plays a role in changing visual perceptions into long term memories. Therefore, according to Quiroga et al, activity in the medial temporal lobe is required to initiate “perception processes” so that the perceived images can be stored as long term memories. In other words, according to Quiroga et al, the medial temporal lobe “signals” other areas of the brain to perceive or recognize a visual stimulus so the stimulus can be committed to long term memory.

Quiroga et al sought to determine the response rate of neurons in the medial temporal lobe when subjects reported conscious recognition of images portraying familiar faces, landmarks and animals. To test the response rate, Quiroga et al flashed the images for successively shorter intervals in order to examine the activity of neurons in the medial temporal lobe. Quiroga et al assert they found activity in the medial temporal lobe was essentially the same for images flashed for durations of 33ms, 66ms, and 132ms. However, Quiroga et al state, images flashed for 264ms triggered a much greater amount of neuronal firings in the medial temporal lobe. According to Quiroga et al, the subjects’ reports of conscious perception of the images matched the activity in the medial temporal lobe. In other words, the activity in the medial temporal lobe increased when subjects reported consciously recognizing the images. Quiroga et al state the activity in the medial temporal lobe started at about 300ms, and in some cases lasted up to 1000ms, after the image was flashed in the subjects’ field of view. Additionally, Quiroga et al note, the neurons fired in an “all-or-none fashion,” meaning, before stimulus presentation there was practically no activity but once a familiar image was presented a great deal of activity occurred. Quiroga et al also state subjects displayed no activity when the image flashed was not familiar to them.

Quiroga et al’s findings regarding the activation of the medial temporal lobe and the continuation of activity even after the image is no longer in the field of sight seem to corroborate Rees et al’s findings regarding the medial temporal lobe showing activity in response to specific types of visual stimuli and this activity occurring even when the individual is asked to simply just imagine the specific type of visual stimuli. For Quiroga et al, these findings seem to indicate the “memory-like” nature of the medial temporal lobe. Ultimately, Quiroga et al assert the medial temporal lobe serves as a “link” between conscious recognition and long term memory because the neurons only become activated in response to recognized images, and because the neurons continue their activation long after the image is no longer visually seen.

At this point, the above mentioned articles have asserted the neural correlates of consciousness seem to exist in several areas of brain, as well as indicate it is not just activity in the brain, but the duration and type of activity in the brain which leads to consciousness. In “Converging Intracranial Markers of Conscious Access,” Raphael Gaillard et al researched overall locations, strengths and durations of neuronal activity. To do this, Gaillard et al briefly flashed masked and unmasked words in epileptic subjects’ (with embedded electrodes) field of view and measured brain activity using an iEEG.

Gaillard et al assert their experimental aim was to test assertions proposed by the global workspace model of consciousness and they begin by explaining the model. Per Gaillard et al, while many areas of the brain work at the same time to process information unconsciously, consciousness arises if and only if very specific conditions convene. First, according to Gaillard et al, activity in the visual cortical regions must occur in response to specific types of stimuli associated with those areas (seemingly corresponding with Rees et al’s, Roth’s, Carmel et al’s and Quiroga et al’s research regarding the ventral visual cortex). Secondly, per Gaillard et al, the activity beginning in the visual cortical regions must occur for a sufficient amount of time, and must be of a sufficient amount of strength, in order to proceed along the cortical pathway to the higher cortical areas of the parietal and prefrontal cortices (again, seemingly corresponding to Rees et al’s, Carmel et al’s and Roth’s findings regarding the roles of the parietal and prefrontal regions). Thirdly, states Gaillard et al, the activity must be amplified throughout several areas of the brain through forward and backward connections, “ignit[ing]” neurons throughout several areas in synchronous “self-sustained reverberation” (seemingly similar to Roth’s assertions regarding forward and backward synaptic connections temporarily strengthening their connections and working together, synchronously). Gaillard et al assert, according to the global workspace model, the experience of phenomenal and subjective consciousness is a result of stimuli being represented on so many different levels of the brain.

Gaillard et al explain their results for masked words showed activity in 43 of the 176 electrodes, primarily in the occipital lobe, and in order of extent, in the temporal lobe, parietal lobe and the frontal lobe. Conversely, for unmasked words, 121 of the 176 electrodes showed activity primarily in the frontal lobe, and in order of extent, in the occipital lobe, temporal lobe and parietal lobe. Per Gaillard et al, while the majority of activation for masked words occurred in just a few areas, activity was more equally distributed among more areas for unmasked words.

Regarding the duration of the activation, Gaillard et al note masked words, as a mean average, resulted in activity lasting approximately 60ms. Conversely, states Gaillard et al, unmasked words, as a mean average, resulted in activity lasting approximately 378ms. However, explains Gaillard et al, the activity from masked words occurred earlier, at 366ms (mean), than unmasked words, at 522ms (mean). Once activity started, however, the activity associated with unmasked word lasted longer and extended to more areas than did the activity for masked words, states Gaillard et al.

Additionally, explains Gaillard et al, while masked words showed gamma band oscillations (which are neuronal patterns of oscillating frequencies ranging from 20-100 Hz) initially peaking at 100-200ms after being presented then dropping off, unmasked words showed a peak and then continued activity for up to 800ms after being presented. Gaillard et al assert masked words showed an initial peak of gamma band activity which then quickly leveled off, while unmasked words showed more oscillations at a greater strength and for a longer period of time. Additionally, Gaillard et al used iERPs to measure the voltage strength and progression of activity. The activity, per Gaillard et al, for masked words showed a slight peak originating in the occipitotemporal areas then declining with almost no observable activity in the other areas. The activity for unmasked words was “stronger and lasted longer,” states Gaillard et al, and started in the posterior (visual cortical) regions with significant activity progressing to other areas. Gaillard et al assert the gamma band activity and the activity observed through the iERPs together are “correlated measures” which show conscious and unconscious brain processes. Gaillard et al’s findings seem to corroborate Quiroga et al’s findings which also showed activity starting at about 300ms and lasting up to 1000ms (specifically in the medial temporal lobe).

Gaillard et al also tested the synchronization of beta wave activity (12-30Hz) by testing to see if, after many observations, areas of the brain showed a “systematic phase relationship.” In other words, they tested to see if the activity in different areas of the brain showed to occur repeatedly together, each time in the same ways. Overall, Gaillard et al assert beta wave activity across all electrodes for unmasked words showed to be synchronous during the time frame of 300-500ms after exposure to the stimulus, meaning the beta waves in one area of the brain appeared to be in synch with the beta waves in other areas of the brain. According to Gaillard et al, masked words resulted in no changes to the synchrony of beta wave activity. Additionally, Gaillard et al tested sets of electrodes, to see if an electrode in one hemisphere of the brain showed beta wave activity in conjunction with an electrode in another hemisphere of the brain. Gaillard et al assert unmasked words showed beta wave activity increased across the sets while masked words actually showed a decrease in beta wave activity. Additionally, Gaillard et al assert they observed a small increase in beta activity in the visual cortex area for masked words, but unmasked words triggered synchronous activity across not only the visual cortex, but many other areas as well. These findings explain Rees et al’s findings regarding the activity triggered by masked words in the ventral visual cortex, in that the activity occurs but only marginally.

Gaillard et al state their final examination entailed the use of a mathematical program to check for Granger Causality. Per Gaillard et al, the beta wave testing and Granger Causality testing were similar because they both checked for correlation. However, as Gaillard et al assert, “it is possible for electrode j to causally influence i without i causally influencing j” and “it is also possible for two signals to exert mutual causal influences on each other.” The Granger Causality test, in other words, was done to determine the probabilities of the activity in different areas of the brain actually having a causal effect on each other, and in which direction (from j to i or from i to j) the causal effect occurred. Gaillard et al explain the program showed a large increase in probability of causation beginning with the posterior regions (i.e. the regions of the ventral visual cortex) and moving toward the occipitofrontal regions. The “evolution” of the causality showed a peak at 146ms when the masked words were presented and another peak at 325ms, which only occurred when the unmasked words were presented. Additionally, unmasked words showed a “causal gain” at 300ms-500ms after presentation, notes Gaillard et al. A probability gain which was not observed in the masked words, which shows a strong causal gain at times of “conscious processing” according to Gaillard et al.

According to Gaillard et al, their results all lend support to the global workspace model of consciousness. Additionally, Gaillard et al’s results seem to share similarities with Rees et al’s, Roth’s, Carmel et al’s and Quiroga et al’s findings. First, Gaillard et al’s results showed activity originating from the ventral visual cortex, an area which, as Rees et al had shown, is responsible for conscious perception of specific types of visual stimuli, including the processing of words. Secondly, Gaillard et al’s results showed the duration and strength of gamma band and beta wave activity was significant up to 300-500ms (in some cases up to 800ms) after the stimuli was no longer present, durations very similar to Quiroga et al’s findings regarding the durations of activity in the medial temporal lobe. The strength and duration of the activity is sufficient for the activity to proceed from the ventral visual cortex to higher order regions like the parietal and prefrontal regions. The parietal and prefrontal regions, per Rees et al and Carmel et al, are activated during conscious recognition and awareness, which requires, per Quiroga et al, activity in the medial temporal lobe. Thirdly, Gaillard et al’s results showed the activity occurred in several areas of the brain synchronously, with a strong probability of causation from posterior areas of the brain to the frontal regions, moving across distant parts of the brain. Per Roth, the associative regions of the parietal, frontal and temporal lobes (due to having a huge number of neurons tightly packed together) have forward and backward connections which facilitate synchronous activities and communications across distant parts of the brain. If these scientists’ findings are true, and if I am correct in correlating the findings, then it seems “consciousness,” from the scientific viewpoint, arises from a complex interaction of sustained synchronous gamma and beta wave events between many areas of the brain.

Works Cited

Carmel, David, Nilli Lavie and Geraint Rees. “Conscious Awareness of Flicker in Humans Involves Frontal and Parietal Cortex.” Current Biology (2006): 907-911.

Gaillard, Raphael, Dehaene Stanislas, Claude Adam, Stephane Clemenceau, Dominique Hasboun, Michel Baulac, Laurent Cohen, Lionel Naccache. “Converging Intracranial Markers of Conscious Access.” PLoS Biology (2009): 0472-0492.

Quiroga, R. Quian, R Mukamel, E.A Isham, R. Malach, I. Fried. “Human Single-Neuron Responses at the Threshold of Conscious Recognition.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2008): 3599-3604.

Rees, Geraint, Gabriel Kreiman and Christof Koch. “Neural Correlates of Consciousness in Humans.” Nature Reviews (2002): 261-270.

Roth, Gerhard. “The Quest to Find Consciousness.” Scientific American Special Edition (2004): 32-39.

Fragments of Insignificance

Bruises seeping

justified by her inaction

an action of being bad

punishment fulfilled

little girls deserve

degradation

he doesn’t remember

Insignificance

 

Hiding in the dark

justified by her inaction

on a cold tiled floor

manipulated child’s game

locked bathroom door

violation

he doesn’t remember

Insignificance

 

Errors repeating

justified by her inaction

mistaken affection

chemical paralysis

self hate perceived

depredation

he doesn’t remember

Insignificance

 

Beauty fleeting

justified by her inaction

reality unforgivably

flawed by imperfection

desire for magazine

attraction

he doesn’t remember

Insignificance

 

Memories built upon:

Each a portion of:

Taught to recreate:

A picture of a life of:

Wishes to forget:

Demonstrations of:

insignificance

 

Ataraxia Impossible

relinquishing of your existence

from the spaces you inhabit

in the well guarded chambers

of admiration and desire

releasing of vivid recollections

striking facial expressions

each charming and captivating

reflections of personality

transgression of attraction

has proven impossible

ataraxia impossible

insomnia opening a portal

in my discontented mind

a realistic dimension of hell

malicious illusionary images

tease with glimpses of possibility

upon eager lips and fingertips

until you turn dismissively

leaving me to insignificance

transgression of fascination

has proven impossible

ataraxia impossible

On Love

Love is broken down in different categories, such as the love one has for objects or activities which is very different from the love one has for beings. One could say they love music, but one could also say they love their parents. Certainly, one would not love music in the same way they love their parents. Even the love one has for beings is further categorized by love for pets, friends, family or for a significant other. Again, one could love their pet, but this would be entirely different (hopefully-quite disturbing if not) from the love they would have for their significant other. What is the nature of love? While each of these types of love are recognizably different, what essentially connects them so that each could appropriately be described as “love?”

St. Thomas Aquinas states: “An act of love always tends toward two things: to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it; since to love a person is to wish that person good.” For Aquinas, “to love a person is to wish that person good,” which, in other words, is to care about the person. What does it mean to “care” about someone? To “care” could mean two things. The term “care” is akin to “concern” or “significance.” To say one “loves,” and thus “cares,” about another is to say one has “concern” for another person or is to say another person is “significant” is one’s life. “Concern” is as Aquinas has noted, wanting what is best for the person. “Significance” is akin to “meaningful” or “importance.” One would be “significant” to another if they contributed to one’s life in some meaningful or important way, regardless of the frequency of interaction. For example, “significance” could be a being (or object or activity) who (which) has the ability to cause another to feel a certain way which the person enjoys.

Furthermore, if one were to say they “love,” thus “care,” about music, one would be saying they are “concerned” with music and music is “significant” in their lives. One would not want anything to happen which could destroy the creation of music because music is meaningful to their lives, thus the connection to “concern” and “significance” is evident. Therefore, for all types of love, it appears “concern” and “significance” play a role.

However, while to “care” is a necessary condition for any type of love, it certainly is not a sufficient condition for love. One could “care” about others, have “concern” for others, but not “love” others simply because the others are not “significant” in one’s life. The “care” which leads to “love” is of the sort in which one not only has “concern” for the being (or object or activity), but the being (or object or activity) plays a “significant” role in one’s life. To “love” requires a unique type of “care” consisting of both “concern” and “significance.”

If, to have “concern” for another (being or object or activity), as noted earlier is to want what is best for them (or it), even if what is best for the other person (or object or activity) goes against one’s own self-interest, then one would pursue what is best for the other person (or object or activity) regardless of what is in one’s own self-interest. However, if to “love” also requires “significance” and “significance” is how another (being or object or activity) contributes in a meaningful or important way to one’s life, then what is in one’s self-interest is achieved. Therefore, love is a unique balance between “selflessness” and “self-interest.” At some times, more “selfless” and at other times more “self-interested.”

The above can be easily recognized in relationships between beings, for example, a mother sacrificing her life to save her child’s life or euthanizing a suffering and dying pet even though the owner doesn’t want to lose the animal. However, this is also true of objects or activities. For example, one could “love” the local art scene and seek to support the local art scene even though they have to make sacrifices which go against their own “self-interest” to do so. In the former cases, one sacrifices their own “self-interest” out of “concern” for what they “love.” In the latter case, one sacrifices part of their own “self-interest” out of “concern” for what they “love” in order to preserve the continuation of what they “love,” which accommodates their own “self-interest” in the long run.

If to “love” is to “care” about another, to have “concern” for another who is “significant” in one’s life, then another aspect of love is unavoidably “pain.” “Pain” should be understood, in this sense, as emotional distress. If one “loves” another (being or object or activity), then the being or object is capable of causing one pain. One can’t love another who is incapable of causing them pain.

For example, a man “loves” his wife. He wants what is best for her and she contributes to his life in a meaningful and important way. If she died, it would be “painful” for him. However, if the man did not “love” his wife, her death might be inconvenient (funerals are so much work-why again can’t she just be buried in the backyard?), he might feel “pain” for his children because he “loves” his children and they “loved” their mother, but he himself would not feel “pain” over his wife’s death.

Numerous examples of this can be given. Consider the act of lying in regards to the connection between “love” and “pain.” If one lies to another person, and the other person lied to feels no emotional distress over it, obviously one didn’t “care” too much about the liar. The connection also applies to objects and activities. If a person “loves” soccer, and the entire sport of soccer was destroyed, collapsed under the anarchy of soccer hooligans, then the person would be caused “pain” because something they had “concern” for, which was “significant” in their life, was no longer in their life.

However, it is important to note, one can be caused “pain” by others who they do not “love.” Being lied to can cause “pain” even if one doesn’t “love” the liar. “Concern” for others can cause “pain” even if the others are not “significant,” thus “loved,” in one’s life. “Pain” doesn’t necessarily (inevitably) entail “love,” but, “love” necessarily (unavoidably) entails “pain.” “Pain” is not a sufficient condition for “love,” but “pain” is a necessary condition for “love.” Therefore, “pain” is another aspect of the nature of all types of “love.”

So ultimately, what in the hell is “love?” “Love,” is concern, significance, selflessness, self-interest, and pain. Sound like fun?

Recruiting International Students

The issue with this case seems to be, “Is it morally permissible for higher education recruitment agents for international students to be paid on a commission, per student enrolled, basis?” In order to try to answer this question, I will begin by offering main arguments for and against the issue. Next, I will analyze this issue from two viewpoints. First, I will look at the issue from the viewpoint of Immanuel Kant regarding treating others with intrinsic value. Secondly, I will analyze the issue from the viewpoints of David Hume and Louis Pojman. Ultimately I will argue using commission based recruitment in itself is not unethical and asserting it is would be committing a couple of logical fallacies. I will argue it is those who seek to exploit international students by treating them merely with instrumental value who are unethical.

The argument in favor of the use of commission based recruitment in higher education is a linked argument. The argument asserts the tough economy, international students being good for schools, enrollment of international students dwindling and commission based recruitment agencies being better for recruiting students are all combined reasons why institutions should use commission based recruitment agencies. The premises regarding the tough economy and the enrollment of international students dwindling are matters of empirical fact, even if one proves either of them false it wouldn’t seem to answer if under true circumstances if using commission based recruitment is ethical. The same seems to hold for the premise about commission based recruitment being better at recruiting students. Whether or not this is true doesn’t determine if commission based recruitment is ethical. Therefore, the main premise I would like to focus on is the premise that international students are good for schools.

The argument opposed to the use of commission based recruitment in higher education is a convergent argument. The three main premises on this side of the argument are that commission based recruiting is against the law for domestic students, international students suffer, and domestic students suffer. Regarding the premise that domestic students suffer, the reasons given for this are because the more spots given to more sought after international students would limit the opportunities for domestic students. If the issue is if commission based recruiting is unethical, then this domestic students suffer premise seems irrelevant, because the increase of international student enrollments can be done with our without commission based recruiting.

Regarding the premise that commission based recruiting is illegal for domestic students (so, by extension it should be illegal for international students), the reason it is illegal is because a number of for-profit colleges were using commission based recruiting to get students to file for student loans from the US government which the students could never possibly repay. International students can’t get student loans from the US government. But, this premise does implicitly assert commission based recruiting is directly related to self-interested motives for placing students with institutions. The issue of self-interested motivations for placing students with institutions can be incorporated with the premise that international students suffer. So, the premise I will focus on from this side of the argument is the premise regarding international students suffering.

Next, I would like to analyze the issue from a perspective inspired by Kant. Kant argued people, as reasoning and willing so thus autonomous beings, have intrinsic value. Due to having intrinsic value, people should never be treated with instrumental value. People, according to Kant, should never be treated with merely instrumental value, or in other words as a means to an end, but instead with intrinsic value, or in other words as an end within themselves. Many have argued international students are good for institutions because, primarily, international students pay if not full tuition then many times more in tuition than domestic students and institutions during tough economic times need the money to make up for budget shortfalls. It seems at the heart of the issue is money because if domestic students paid full tuition then in tough economic times institutions would not be seeking out international students. The enrollment of international students, even under the most cost effective methods of commission based recruiting, still requires the institution pay the recruiter 10-15% of the students first year’s tuition. So, if domestic students paid full tuition, why would institutions pay 10-15% of an international student’s first year’s tuition to a recruiter? It seems international students are a means to a monetary end. If this is the case, then institutions are treating international students with instrumental value, thus, unethically. However, granted, it could be argued, institutions are not treating international students with merely instrumental value. For this argument to be made, it would have to be shown the international students are being accommodated and integrated autonomously into the institution. However, regardless of autonomous accommodation and integration into the institution, the international students are primarily sought after simply for money, not for what they can autonomously offer the institution as human beings.

On the other side of the issue, many have argued international students suffer. It is argued international students could end up paying too much for a lower quality institution because these students lack the information to bargain and compare offers from different schools. Recruiters only offer information on the schools with which they have arrangements for payment. It is also argued commission based recruiters will lie to students, will misrepresent themselves and the institutions, will encourage and participate in fraudulent activities during the application process, will pressure students into enrollment, and will bring in students who are mismatched to the institution. These arguments stems from the idea that commission based recruitment is inherently unethical because it is motivated by self interest not the interests of the students and not the interests of the institutions. If such claims are true universally, then this would be various degrees of exploitation ranging from outright harmful, to mutually advantageous, to non-consensual, to consensual. Harmful being one taking unfair advantage of another. Mutually advantageous being even though both parties gain something, one party is still at a loss. Non-consensual being one party not agreeing to the arrangements, because possibly of not being fully informed or being lied to or due to fraud. Consensual being both parties having full knowledge of the arrangements, one party agreeing to being at a loss. In any case of exploitation, one party is being treated with instrumental value for the gain of the other. In this specific case, if the claims against commission based recruiting are universally true, then international students are being exploited and treated with instrumental value for the self interested gain of the recruiters. Thus, if these claims are universally true, then commission based recruiting is unethical.

However, the question to consider is, are such claims universally true? Is it absolutely true that every commission based recruiter will put their own self interest above the interests of the students and the institutions? Hume argues empirically “To the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity, such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude.” Furthermore, Hume argues, “What a malignant philosophy must it be that will not allow to humanity and friendship the same privileges which are undisputably granted to the darker passions of enmity and resentment.” Hume is arguing against egoism, a theory which asserts that human actions and emotions are all based off self interest. For Hume, it is obvious via observation there exists un-self interested actions and emotions. Hume asserts people act vengefully without regard to their own safety or welfare, thus self interest. He argues there is something fundamentally mean or wicked in a human disposition which tries to say that “darker” emotions and actions are done without regard to self interest, but kinder emotions and actions are done from self interest. From a viewpoint inspired by Hume, we can observe commission based jobs where self interest is not given the highest priority. Yes, some car salesmen are sleazes, but not all car salesmen are merely motivated by self interest. There seems to be something fundamentally mean or wicked to say every commission based recruiter will treat students and institutions as merely means to a monetary end. In fact, to make such an assertion is a logical fallacy called a hasty generalization.

Pojman also discusses egoism, self interest and altuism. Pojman argues the assertion one must be either altruistic or egoistic is a false dilemma. Pojman uses evolutionary empirical evidence to assert if most people were living in self sacrificing altruism then they would be wiped out over time by egoists. Altruists (aka suckers) would, evolutionarily, decline in numbers as egoists (aka cheaters) take advantage of them and increase in numbers. After a time, Pojman argues, the egoists would also die out because they would have no one left to exploit. Pojman asserts this is a false dilemma because there exists a third option, a reciprocal altruist (aka grudgers), who follow a Rule of Reciprocity. In other words, the reciprocal altruists would help each other and the altruists but not the egoists. Therefore, according to Pojman, the grudgers would evolutionarily thrive where the suckers and cheaters would not. Looking at the commission based recruitment issue from a viewpoint inspired by Pojman, if all commission based recruiters were merely cheaters acting out of their own self interest, there would be no way the recruiter position could be maintained in the economic environment-metaphorically speaking, they would all die out. To say commission based recruiting must be universally self interested or universally un-self interested is, similar to Pojman’s assertion, a logical fallacy called a false dilemma. There is a third option, one could very well work out of the self interest of maintaining their job by doing what is beneficial for the students and the institutions. Just like the car salesmen, the grudgers of the commission based recruitment world, will recognize they will not be able to survive unless they do what is right for the students and the institutions.

Ultimately, commission based recruiting in itself is not unethical. To say it is would be committing the fallacies of hasty generalization and false dilemma. What is unethical, is one person (or organization or institution) treating another as merely a means to a monetary end. In the case of higher education institutions and commission based recruitment, some of the institutions and the recruiters could be unethical in their treatment of international students, but that doesn’t mean all of them are. Weeding out those who do treat others as means to an end, through enforceable standards, would be the best solution.

Freedom to Burn Religious Texts

In this case it seems the issue is: “Is it morally permissible to burn religious texts?” To try to answer this question, I will first outline the arguments which assert it is not morally permissible to burn religious texts. Then, I will argue against these arguments using arguments by John Stuart Mill and John Locke. Ultimately, I will argue burning religious texts is morally permissible because it can promote tolerance and it preserves freedom of religion.

Those who argue it is not morally permissible to burn religious texts assert, overall it seems, that it is detrimental to the greater good to burn religious texts. First, it is argued it is harmful because it furthers intolerance and bigotry. Second, it is harmful to freedom of religion.

In his Harm Principle, Mill argued “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” and not just harm, but imminent serious harm. As a utilitarian principle, Mill is concerned with the utility of the principle, meaning, that the principle will result in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The first objection to the burning of religious texts asserts it is harmful because it furthers intolerance and bigotry. Mill also argued “there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered.” and there should be “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological.” For Mill, freedom of expression should be protected because the truth of any issue can be determined only when all views are represented, and because people best appreciate the truth when it is achieved through their own reason and experience, which leads to the greatest good for the greatest number. It has also been argued protecting expression which is considered hateful or upsetting actually helps society become more tolerant of other viewpoints which are not so extreme. The burning of religious texts is disrespectful and repulsive, but people from many different religious backgrounds were exposed to the view, used their reason to determine and appreciate the truth that burning religious texts is disrespectful and repulsive, and most significantly, they came together to condemn Pastor Jones’ actions. People of many different religious backgrounds came together all sharing a common viewpoint. It seems that in itself demonstrates tolerance and camaraderie, all of which was born of a hateful act of expression.

Another argument against the moral permissibility to burning religious texts is that it is dangerous to freedom of expression. In this case, citizens burning religious texts is in no way government sanctioning of one religion over another, thus is not government restricting religious practice. So, in this sense, it would not be dangerous to freedom of religion because no one with authority to persecute others is saying anyone else can’t follow their religion. Locke argued for a robust concept of freedom of religion in society. Locke argued “it cannot be supposed the people should give any one or more of their fellow men authority over them for any other purpose than for their own preservation, or to extend the limits of their jurisdiction beyond the limits of this life.” He asserted all citizens should have full liberty to worship as they choose and no one should ever force their religious views on another. So, the question becomes, would burning a religious text be forcing religious views on another? It doesn’t seem so, because no one has to participate in or view the burning of the religious text nor acknowledge or accept that the burning of the religious text is in itself moral. However, the question could also be asked, is restricting others from burning religious texts forcing religious views on another? By the government restricting people from burning religious texts, the government would be forcing the public to observe and treat the texts as sacred (at least in the sense that the texts are in a protected class which makes them unable to be burned out of protest, when nothing else is protected from this sort of expression). By the government restricting people from burning religious texts the government would be forcing a religious viewpoint onto the people. In this sense, burning religious texts actually ensures and preserves the freedom of religion.

I have argued it is morally permissible to burn religious texts because it could actually promote tolerance and it preserves the freedom of religion.

Doggie Livestock

The issue with this case seems to be: “Are we morally obligated to legally regulate dog breeding facilities?” particularly in response to Missouri Proposition B. In order to try to answer this question, I will first outline the arguments against regulating dog breeding facilities. I will argue against the points made by those opposed to regulations by using a number of ethical theories by Tom Regan, Michael Pollan, Aristotle and Peter Singer. I will argue we are morally obligated to legally regulate dog breeding facilities because animals have intrinsic value, animals should be treated with respect and dignity, virtue requires breeders not place monetary gain over the treatment of the animals, and even if it leads to euthanizing animals, it is for the greater good.

Those against regulating dog breeding facilities offer four main arguments. First, regulations are unnecessary, due to breeders have an incentive to take good care of the dogs, because raising the dogs is a source of income. Second, regulations on dog breeding facilities would lead to more government control over agriculture. Third, the regulations force hardline vegan standards on unwilling breeders. Fourth, the regulations would lead to greater animal cruelty, because it forces breeders to euthanize or dispose of otherwise healthy dogs, because the law would prevent animals from staying in over crowded facilities.

The first argument offered by those opposed to regulating dog breeding facilities is the breeders have a monetary incentive to take good care of the dogs, therefore, it is unnecessary to implement regulations on dog breeding facilities. What if breeders don’t have a monetary incentive to take good care of the dogs? The Huffington Post noted the Better Business Bureau received over 352 complaints against Missouri breeders in 2009 regarding the health of the animals. The Columbian Missourian noted the non-profit organization Operation Bark rescued approximately 3,700 dogs and noted approximately 350 commercial breeders went out of business in Missouri because of unhealthy facilities. For these breeders, perhaps the monetary incentive for healthy breeding facilities wasn’t enough or, perhaps, they had more of a monetary incentive not to provide the animals with healthy living conditions, or perhaps they are just simply bad business people who can‘t recognize the monetary incentive. The question then becomes, is it moral to treat dogs in these breeding facilities as merely a means to a monetary end? Regan argues animals, just like humans, have intrinsic value, meaning they have value simply for what they are and not for how they can benefit others. Regan asserts, animals and humans, are all “subjects of a life that is better or worse for us, logically independently of anyone else’s valuing us or finding us useful.” What Regan means by this is humans and animals all have lives which the quality of matters independently and individually to them. Due to this, humans and animals, should never be treated merely as a means to an end. Under the argument offered by opponents of regulating dog breeding facilities, animals are merely tools to a monetary end. Due to the animals being mere tools, these breeders can treat them in whatever way that best achieves their purpose of monetary gain. Therefore, if there is not a compelling and outright monetary incentive to treat animals well, which in at least some cases there appears to have not been, then breeders will not treat animals well.

The second argument offered by opponents of regulating dog breeding facilities asserts more regulations on dog breeding facilities would lead to more government control over agriculture. Missouri Proposition B states its intent is to “prohibit cruel and inhumane treatment of dogs in puppy mills by requiring large-scale dog breeding operations to provide each dog under their care with basic food and water, adequate shelter from the elements, necessary veterinary care, adequate space to turn around and stretch his or her limbs, and regular exercise.” The bill states nothing about any other sort of animal and even excludes dogs in numerous other situations. I have searched without success for any reasons exactly why regulations on dog breeding facilities would transfer over to other agricultural businesses. At this point, this premise for the opponents argument seems like nothing but a slippery slope fallacy. However, giving the argument the benefit of the doubt, what if the regulations in question did transfer over to other livestock? The regulations in the bill call for access to nutritious food, amount appropriate for healthy weight atleast once a day, potable water free of contaminants, veterinary care atleast once a year and prompt treatment of injuries or illness, humane euthanasia, constant access to indoor areas to get away from the elements which is cleaned atleast once a day, sufficient space in animals enclosures to be able to turn around and stretch their limbs without impediment, and unfettered access to an outside solid ground area with proper drainage and some protection from the elements. The living environments of hundreds of thousands of animals at industrial farms wouldn’t be up to these regulations. Pollan argues industrial farms “offer a nightmarish glimpse of what capitalism can look like in the absence of moral or regulatory constraint,” because, the animals are treated merely as commodities to be raised and slaughtered as cost effectively as possible. Pollan’s argument regarding the “mutualism of species” asserts animals and humans have evolved together, dependent upon each other for survival in a relationship where humans raise animals, thus ensuring the survival of the animals’ species, and animals provide themselves as food, thus ensuring human survival. The problem, as Pollan sees it, is not eating animals or raising animals as a commodity, it is raising animals as merely a commodity. Pollan argues, “For any animal, happiness seems to consist in the opportunity to express its creaturely nature.” If the exact same regulations outlined in Missouri Proposition B are applied to other livestock, then it would be simply allowing the animals our society uses for nourishment and monetary gain to express their creaturely natures.

The third argument offered asserts the regulations force hardline vegan standards on unwilling breeders. What exactly is meant by “hardline vegan standards”? I was able to locate arguments offered by opponents which asserted the construction of kennels with unfettered indoor/outdoor access would be to costly for them to do. I also found other arguments which asserted the restrictions on a max of 50 breeding dogs and the restrictions on having breeding females breed only twice per season were too prohibitive because the breeders would lose money. Regarding the indoor/outdoor, max amount of breeding dogs, and resting times between breeding, these arguments offered by opponents all go back to treating the animals as merely commodities, treating the animals as merely means to a monetary end. Simply, the opponents are arguing there is not a monetary incentive for breeders to comply with these regulations. If this is the case, then the breeders are acknowledging their treatment of the animals rests on the monetary incentive to them. Essentially, the hardline vegan standards argument amounts to the breeders desire for money over the welfare of the animals. Aristotle argued in nature, animals are of a lower hierarchy than humans because humans have the ability to reason, therefore, animals are to be used to serve the needs of humans. However, Aristotle also argued to be moral, is to use reason to live a virtuous life. The virtuous life, according to Aristotle, is one in which excellence of virtue, practical wisdom and flourishing and/or happiness, are all present and displayed through a moderate disposition. Aristotle argues the virtuous disposition is one in which character traits are either not too excessive in nature nor too deficient in nature. For example, kindness would be a moderate character trait in between the excess of being a push over or the deficient of being a jerk. Prudent would be a moderate character trait in between the excess of greed and the deficient of frivolous. Using Aristotle’s argument regarding the virtuous life, humans breeding dogs for an income is not wrong in and of itself, but humans deficiently focusing on money over the care of the animals or excessively focusing on the care of the animals over money would be immoral. The question then becomes, at what point is the care of the animals to an excess? The opponents seem to be arguing the indoor/outdoor kennels, resting time between breeding and max on 50 dogs is excessive care. To respond, in an Aristotlian way, let’s use practical wisdom. Using practical wisdom, a virtuous person who is kind, thoughtful and compassionate, would not breed hundreds of female dogs, emaciated from having their fourth litter in the season, all crammed together exposed to the elements, as it is not conducive to flourishing and happiness of their own virtuous character. Using practical wisdom, a virtuous person with a moderate disposition would view each situation individually and see if their response to the situation is conducive to the flourishing and happiness of their virtuous character. The problem is the empirical evidence shows that too many breeders have excessively or deficiently placed monetary gain over virtue.

The final argument offered by opponents assert the regulations would cause more animal suffering because the 50 dog max would force them to euthanize otherwise healthy dogs. Leading up to the implementation of the bill, which has actually now been re-worked to take out the regulation regarding the 50 dog max, numerous national animal welfare organizations like the Humane Society and the ASPCA were expanding to be able to take in the increase of dogs and find as many as possible homes. So, instead of those healthy dogs living as a part of a mass of other dogs, many of them could have been given homes. Apart from hypothetical speculation on just how many healthy dogs would have been euthanized versus given homes, what if otherwise healthy dogs were euthanized? Would this lead to more animal suffering? Singer argues moral consideration should be given equally to any being that can suffer. The suffering of any sentient being has the same equal worth as the suffering of any other sentient being. As a utilitarian, Singer asserts the morally right thing to do is minimize suffering. So, the question then is which would cause the least amount of suffering-letting dogs stay in the breeding facilities or euthanizing them? Let’s look at the concept of suffering. Physically and mentally, living in conditions which are cramped, where one is unable to move much and is used merely to have pups, doesn’t promote the optimal amount of happiness possible, produces at the very least some suffering and it is prolonged, over many years. Euthanizing is definitely not promoting the optimal amount of happiness possible, but it is done to minimize pain and is certainly not prolonged over years. Neither option promotes the optimal amount of happiness possible, both options (granted) involve some suffering, but, the animals continuing to live in dog breeding facilities for years prolongs the suffering. Therefore, to minimize suffering, it would actually be more moral to euthanize the animals. To minimize suffering, even if the regulations led to euthanizing animals, it would be for the greater good.

I have argued we do have a moral obligation to legally regulate dog breeding facilities. First, because animals are subjects of life with intrinsic value. Secondly, because animals with intrinsic value should be treated with dignity and respect. Thirdly, because a virtuous dog breeder would use their practical wisdom to treat animals with dignity and respect, but far too many dog breeders have placed monetary gain over virtue. Fourthly, because even if the regulations do lead to euthanizing animals, it minimizes suffering, so is for the greater good.